

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-125/1

T.S. 141816 Copy # 151

30 July 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF IAC AND USCIB

SUBJECT: Revision of NSCIDs

1. As of 28 July members of the IAC and USCIB concurred in draft NSCID 6 in the form it was circulated on 23 July (IAC-D-123/1), subject to the insertion of "and non-communications electromagnetic radiations" after "communications" in the third line of paragraph 10c. Concurrences were also received on that day with respect to the draft letter of transmittal to the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the proposed change sheets for NSCIDs 2, 3, 4 and 5 which had been circulated separately (IAC-D-125, 23 July).

2. At the meeting on 29 July the IAC members agreed to a revised draft of the new draft NSCID 7 incorporating certain changes which were proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum dated 24 February 1958 to the Secretary of Defense, and later circulated by the Executive Secretary, NSC, to members of the National Security Council by a memorandum of 11 March. Subsequent to the IAC meeting NSA and General Erskine's office also concurred in the draft NSCID 7, as revised at the IAC meeting.

3. The required IAC and USCIB actions on NSCIDs 1 through 7 thus have been completed. The letter of transmittal (modified to take cognizance of the action with respect to NSCID 7), together with the new draft NSCIDs 1, 6 and 7 and change sheets for NSCIDs 2, 3, 4 and 5 appropriate for conforming them to the proposed drafts NSCIDs 1 and 6, will be forwarded promptly to the Executive Secretary, NSC.

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WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT b.

MORI/CDF Pages 1-2, 30-33,

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4. For your convenience we are enclosing new pages 1 and 9 for draft NSCID 6 which should be substituted for the corresponding pages in the 23 July draft (IAC-D-123/1). In addition, we are forwarding a copy of the draft NSCID 7 which reflects the changes agreed to by IAC and USCIB members on 29 July.

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Secretary

Attachments

- a. NSCID 7
- b. New pages 1 & 9 for NSCID 6

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IAC/USCIB Approved Draft .  
Proposed NSCID 7  
29 July 1958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7

CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102, as amended, of the National Security Act of 1947, in order that the President and other members of the National Security Council may be provided with timely critical intelligence, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There shall be established communications means for the most timely transmission of critical intelligence, particularly that related to early warning of Soviet attack.

2. The Secretary of Defense shall be the Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of such communications means, necessary to provide the most timely transmission of critical intelligence to higher authorities. In the execution of this responsibility, he shall effect coordination with other Government agencies in order that their communications facilities may be utilized to the extent deemed practicable.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and support of the members of the United States Intelligence Board, shall provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the

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(Attachment a)

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communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the United States Intelligence Board, shall define critical intelligence and establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence.

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IAC/USCIB Approved Draft  
Post-Merger NSCID 6  
28 July 1958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6\*  
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE

1. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and the activities pertaining thereto (as defined in paragraph 4 of this directive) are national responsibilities whose importance to national security requires an organization and management which will:

- a. Exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies to satisfy legitimate requirements for foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including those of the departments and agencies concerned;
- b. Provide for efficiency and economy in the use of technical resources; and
- c. Insure the necessary degree of protection.

Therefore, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that COMINT and the COMINT activities of the United States, as well as ELINT and ELINT activities, shall be conducted as prescribed herein. COMINT and ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities except as otherwise established under this directive.

2. Only those departments or agencies represented on the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) are authorized to engage in COMINT or ELINT activities and only in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

\*This directive supersedes NSCID No. 9, revised 29 December 1952, and NSCID No. 17, dated 16 May 1955.

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10. The Military Departments. The Military Departments shall be responsible for:

a. The establishment, maintenance, operation and administration of COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing facilities as authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The conduct of those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID 5 as specifically excepted from other provisions of this directive (NSCID 6) by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

c. The conduct, outside the scope of paragraphs 7 and 8 of this directive, of such search, intercept, direction finding, range estimation, and signal analysis of communications and non-communications electromagnetic radiations as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue operations.

11. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique

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29 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's  
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence  
Activities, dated 24 October 1957

REFERENCE : NSC Action #1873 dated 13 March 1958

1. As directed in memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence dated 14 March 1958, subject as above, I have consulted with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board as to the best means for carrying out NSC Action 1873, of 13 March 1958, directing establishment of a single U. S. Intelligence Board. With the concurrence of the members of the IAC and of USCIB, I am herewith forwarding proposals for revision of the present NSCID 1 (New Series) and of NSCID 9 (the latter to be renumbered NSCID 6 of the New Series) to accomplish the recommended action.

2. In the proposed revised NSCID 6 there has also been incorporated language to assign to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Agency responsibility for the conduct of ELINT activities, in accordance with USCIB-approved recommendations of a special USCIB Task Force for effecting such action, as recommended by the Baker Panel. This draft NSCID 6 would, therefore, replace both the present NSCID 9 and the present NSCID 17, dealing with COMINT and

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
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ELINT, respectively. You will note that distribution of NSCID 6 should be closely limited and that only a limited number of the drafts thereof have been attached.

3. If the National Security Council approves these two revised directives, only minor additional changes will be necessary in NSCIDs 2, 3, 4 and 5 (of the New Series, effective 21 April 1958) as indicated in separate change sheets appended hereto.

4. I am also attaching a revised draft of the proposed new NSCID 7, Critical Intelligence Communications - on which NSC action has been held in abeyance pending receipt from the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence of recommendations for its detailed implementation (due 15 August 1958). This revision incorporates certain changes which were proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum dated 24 February 1958 to the Secretary of Defense, circulated to the members of the National Security Council as an attachment to your memorandum of March 11 on this subject.

  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

Attachments:

- a. Revised NSCID 1
- b. Revised NSCID 6 (T.S. - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
- c. Change Sheet - NSCID 2
- d. Change Sheet - NSCID 3
- e. Change Sheet - NSCID 4
- f. Change Sheet - NSCID 5
- g. Revised NSCID 7

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IAC/USCIB Approved Draft  
15 July 1958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1\*

BASIC DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The intelligence effort of the United States is a national responsibility, and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government and to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council and of the departments and agencies of the Government. For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. Over-all Coordination.

The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council directives. Such coordination shall include both special and other forms of intelligence which together constitute the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.

2. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

a. To maintain the relationship necessary for a fully coordinated intelligence community,\*\* and to provide for a more effective

\*This directive supersedes NSCID 1, revised 4/21/58.

\*\*The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence Agency; the Intelligence components of the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and of the Joint Staff (JCS); the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency. Other components of the departments and agencies of the Government are included to the extent of their agreed participation in regularly-established interdepartmental intelligence activities.

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integration of and guidance to the national intelligence effort, a United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is hereby established under the directives of the National Security Council and under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Board shall advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities and pursuant to paragraph 1 above. Subject to other established responsibilities under existing law and to the provisions of National Security Council directives, the Board shall also:

- (1) Establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned.
- (2) Establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.
- (3) Review and report on the national foreign-intelligence effort as a whole.
- (4) Make recommendations on foreign-intelligence matters to appropriate United States officials, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director of the National Security Agency.
- (5) Develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
- (6) Formulate, as appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

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b. The membership of the U. S. Intelligence Board shall consist of the following:

- (1) The Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman.
- (2) The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
- (3) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.
- (4) The Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).
- (5) The Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, (JCS).
- (6) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.
- (7) The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
- (8) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
- (9) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (10) A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall invite the chief of any other department or agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the U. S. Intelligence Board whenever matters within the purview of his department or agency are to be discussed.

c. The Board shall determine its own procedures. It shall be provided with a Secretariat staff, which shall be under the direction

of an Executive Secretary appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the members of the Board.

d. The U. S. Intelligence Board shall reach its decisions by agreement. When the Chairman determines that a given position on a matter under consideration represents the consensus of the Board it shall be considered as agreed unless a dissenting member requests that the issue be referred to the National Security Council. Upon such request, the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall refer the matter, together with the dissenting brief, to the National Security Council for decision.

Provided: That such appeals to the National Security Council by representatives from the military departments, the Director of the National Security Agency, or the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, shall be taken only after review by the Secretary of Defense.

Whenever matters of concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and/or the Atomic Energy Commission are referred to the National Security Council, the Attorney General and/or the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission respectively, shall sit with the Council. The Board may recommend through its Chairman that a sensitive intelligence matter requiring the attention of higher authority be dealt with by the Council in a restricted meeting, including only those officials who have substantive interest in the matter, or directly by the President.

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e. Decisions and recommendations of the Board shall, as appropriate, be transmitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, to the departments or agencies concerned, or to the National Security Council when higher approval is required, or for information.

f. In making recommendations to the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security, the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurring views of these members of the U. S. Intelligence Board concerned. Such recommendations when approved by the National Security Council shall, as appropriate, be issued as National Security Council Intelligence Directives or as other Council directives and, as applicable, shall be promulgated and implemented by the departments and agencies of the Government.

g. Decisions of the Board arrived at under the authority and procedures of this paragraph shall be binding, as applicable on all departments and agencies of the Government.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence.

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to provide for detailed implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directives by issuing with the concurrence of the U. S. Intelligence Board such supplementary Director of Central Intelligence Directives as may be

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required (see par. 2.d. above). Such directives shall, as applicable, be promulgated and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned.

b. Director of Central Intelligence Directives to be issued in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph a. above shall include:

(1) General guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof, including: (a) establishment of comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives generally applicable to foreign countries and areas; (b) identification from time to time, and on a current basis, of Priority National Intelligence Objectives with reference to specific countries and subjects; and (c) issuance of such comprehensive and priority objectives, for general intelligence guidance, and their formal transmission to the National Security Council.

(2) Establishment of policy, procedures and practices for the maintenance, by the individual components of the intelligence community, of a continuing interchange of intelligence, intelligence information, and other information with utility for intelligence purposes.

(3) Establishment of policy, procedures and practices for the production or procurement, by the individual components of the intelligence community within the limits of their capabilities,

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of such intelligence, intelligence information and other information with utility for intelligence purposes relating to the national security, as may be requested by one of the departments or agencies.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, in consultation with the head of the intelligence or other appropriate component of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States.

4. National Intelligence.

a. National intelligence is that intelligence which is required for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce\* national intelligence with the support of the U. S. Intelligence Board. Intelligence so produced shall have the concurrence, as appropriate, of the members of the U. S. Intelligence Board with intelligence production responsibilities or shall carry a statement of any substantially differing opinion of such a member.

\*By "produce" is meant "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" as provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Section 102 (d) (3).

b. Departmental intelligence is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

c. Interdepartmental intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence which is required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. The subcommittee structure of the U. S. Intelligence Board may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate national intelligence to the President, members of the National Security Council, as appropriate, members of the U. S. Intelligence Board and, subject to existing statutes, to such other components of the Government as the National Security Council may from time to time designate or the U. S. Intelligence Board may recommend. He is further authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence produced within the U. S. Intelligence Board structure on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments and international bodies upon his determination with the concurrence of the U. S. Intelligence Board, that such action would substantially promote the security of the United States: Provided, That such dissemination is consistent with existing statutes and Presidential policy including that reflected in international agreements; and provided further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination.



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Departmental intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence produced outside the U. S. Intelligence Board subcommittee structure may be disseminated in accordance with existing statutes and Presidential policy including that reflected in international agreements.

e. Whenever any member of the U. S. Intelligence Board obtains information which indicates an impending crisis situation which affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision by the President or the National Security Council may be required, he shall immediately transmit the information to the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board as well as to the National Indications Center and to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, immediately prepare and disseminate as appropriate the national intelligence estimate of the situation, in accordance with the procedures outlined above.

5. Protection of Intelligence and of Intelligence Sources and Methods.

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the assistance and support of the members of the U. S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Each department and agency, however, shall remain responsible for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate internal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that

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agency of intelligence information or activity. The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods and to report thereon as requested.

6. Community Responsibilities.

a. In implementation of, and in conformity with, approved National Security Council policy, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with and supported by the other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board and by other appropriate offices, shall:

(1) Call upon the other departments and agencies as appropriate to ensure that on intelligence matters affecting the national security the intelligence community is supported by the full knowledge and technical talent available in the Government;

(2) Ensure that the pertinence, extent and quality of the available foreign intelligence and intelligence information relating to the national security is continually reviewed as a basis for improving the quality of intelligence and the correction of deficiencies;

(3) Take appropriate measures to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible referencing systems within the departments and agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities. Central reference facilities as a service of

common concern shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and/or other departments and agencies, as appropriate; and

(4) Make arrangements with the departments and agencies for the assignment to, or exchange with, the Central Intelligence Agency of such experienced and qualified personnel as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes. In order to facilitate the performance of their respective intelligence missions, the departments and agencies concerned shall, by agreement, provide each other with such mutual assistance as may be within their capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the intelligence community for reasons of economy, efficiency, or operational necessity. In this connection primary departmental interests shall be recognized and shall receive mutual cooperation and support.

b. Insofar as practicable, in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of other departments and agencies and shall make full use of existing capabilities of the other elements of the intelligence community.

c. The departments and agencies of the Government shall establish appropriate policies and procedures to control and limit undesirable publicity relating to intelligence activities.

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IAC/USCIB Approved Draft  
Post-Merger NSCID 6  
28 July 1958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6\*  
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE

1. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) and the activities pertaining thereto (as defined in paragraph 4 of this directive) are national responsibilities whose importance to national security requires an organization and management which will:

- a. Exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies to satisfy legitimate requirements for foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including those of the departments and agencies concerned;
- b. Provide for efficiency and economy in the use of technical resources; and
- c. Insure the necessary degree of protection.

Therefore, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that COMINT and the COMINT activities of the United States, as well as ELINT and ELINT activities, shall be conducted as prescribed herein. COMINT and ELINT and their associated activities shall be treated as being within the framework of general intelligence activities except as otherwise established under this directive.

2. Only those departments or agencies represented on the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) are authorized to engage in COMINT or ELINT activities and only in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

\*This directive supersedes NSCID No. 9, revised 29 December 1952, and NSCID No. 17, dated 16 May 1955.

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3. It is essential that responsibility to conduct those ELINT collection and processing activities which provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations should be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to those commanders, or to the Service cryptologic agencies which support them.

4. Definitions.

For the purpose of this directive, the terms "Communications Intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (1) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or (2) censorship.

ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications,

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electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is the technical and intelligence-information product of ELINT activities.

5. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

In addition to its responsibilities as set forth in paragraph 2 of NSCID 1, the United States Intelligence Board shall:

- a. Study, in connection with its responsibilities for communications intelligence security, the standards and practices of the departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT; and establish procedures whereby departments and agencies not members of the U. S. Intelligence Board are enabled to receive and utilize COMINT.
- b. Determine the degree and type of security protection to be given COMINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them; taking into full account that different levels of sensitivity obtain and applying balanced judgment between the need for exploitation of the COMINT produced and the need to protect the specific producing activity or activities. Procedures for special handling will include treatment of the information in its initial stages and also as it may be included in finished intelligence.
- c. Determine the degree and type of security protection to be given ELINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them. Special COMINT security standards and procedures generally shall not apply to ELINT and ELINT activities.

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6. The Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense is designated as executive agent of the Government for the conduct of COMINT and ELINT activities in accordance with the provisions of this directive and for the maintenance and operation of the National Security Agency.

a. The Secretary of Defense may determine, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence that a COMINT or ELINT matter forwarded by the U. S. Intelligence Board to the National Security Council for decision presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action. His action will be implemented and will govern, pending a decision by the National Security Council.

b. The Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or part authority over the Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

7. The National Security Agency.

a. The COMINT and ELINT missions of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the (1) COMINT and (2) ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States, to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto and to produce COMINT information and ELINT information in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the U. S. Intelligence Board.

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b. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose appointment shall be for a term of four years. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency. The Director shall have a civilian Deputy.

8. The Director, National Security Agency.

a. The Director of NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities of the United States are placed under his operational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT and ELINT operations through them. However, because of the unique technical character of COMINT and ELINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communication with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT or ELINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory,



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subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

b. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:

- (1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies.
- (2) Conducting research and development to meet the needs of NSA and the departments and agencies which are engaged in COMINT or ELINT activities; and coordinating the related research and development conducted by such departments and agencies.
- (3) Determining and submitting to the authorities responsible for logistic support for NSA, requirements together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.
- (4) Within NSA's field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.
- (5) Making such reports and furnishing such information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing, as the Board may request, and bringing to the attention of the Board either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies

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or programs in advance of their adoption by him.

(6) Except on matters which have been decided by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

c. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT and ELINT functions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that the Armed Forces and other departments and agencies being served require direct COMINT and ELINT support of various kinds. In providing this support, operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources will at times be delegated by the Director, for such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to an appropriate agent. Each member department or agency is responsible for stating to the Director, NSA its requirements for direct support.

d. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the Board members in those offices of NSA where the Director, NSA establishes priorities of intercept and processing.

e. It is the intent of this directive that NSA not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence, as distinguished from intelligence information. The production and

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dissemination of finished intelligence are the responsibilities of departments and agencies other than NSA.

9. The Director of Central Intelligence.

a. COMINT and ELINT arrangements with foreign governments shall be conducted in accordance with the policies established by USIB. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the technical advice and assistance of the Director, NSA, shall be the executive agent of the Government for COMINT and ELINT arrangements with intelligence services of all foreign governments, except that such arrangements with the UK, Canada and Australia shall be the responsibility of the Director, NSA, in general consultation with the DCI.

b. Other provisions of this directive are not applicable to those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID 5, whether by the Central Intelligence Agency or by the military departments, which are specifically excepted by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

10. The Military Departments. The Military Departments shall be responsible for:

a. The establishment, maintenance, operation and administration of COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing facilities as authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The conduct of those intercept and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) undertaken under the authority of NSCID 5 as specifically excepted from other provisions of this directive (NSCID 6) by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, to the extent practicable, information pertaining to these activities and derived therefrom shall at all times be handled as to give suitable protection to related COMINT activities or COMINT activities in general. Material which may be collected under these circumstances and which otherwise would have been considered the product of COMINT or ELINT activities will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director, NSA, as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

c. The conduct, outside the scope of paragraphs 7 and 8 of this directive, of such search, intercept, direction finding, range estimation, and signal analysis of communications and non-communications electromagnetic radiations as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue operations.

11. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique

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responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security, including such intercept and processing activities as may be undertaken by the FBI in connection with its functions.

- 10 -

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RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
NSCID 1, dated 15 July 1958 and  
NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 1, lines 1 and 2: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 7, line 5: Change "paragraph 5" to "paragraph 3.a."

Par. 7, lines 6 and 7: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

S-E-C-R-E-T

(ATTACHMENT C)

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 3

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
NSCID 1, dated 15 July 1958 and  
NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 1.e., line 3: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 4, line 3: Change "competency" to "exclusive competence"

Par. 4, line 7: Change "IAC" to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 5, lines 7 and 8: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 7.d., lines 2 and 3: Change "represented on the Intelligence  
Advisory Committee" to "represented on the U. S. Intelligence  
Board with responsibilities for the production of finished  
intelligence".

Par. 8, line 6: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

S-E-C-R-E-T

(ATTACHMENT D)

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
NSCID 1, dated 15 July 1958 and  
NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 2, line 4: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 5, line 3: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 12, lines 3 and 4: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 12, line 4: Change "paragraph 5" to "paragraph 3.a."

S-E-C-R-E-T

(ATTACHMENT E)



RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
NSCID 1, dated 15 July 1958 and  
NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 2.a., lines 1 and 2: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 2.c., lines 2, 3 and 4: Change two references to "Intelligence  
Advisory Committee" to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 9, line 2: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

S-E-C-R-E-T

(ATTACHMENT F)

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC/USCIB Approved Draft  
Proposed NSCID 7  
29 July 1958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7

CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102, as amended, of the National Security Act of 1947, in order that the President and other members of the National Security Council may be provided with timely critical intelligence, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There shall be established communications means for the most timely transmission of critical intelligence, particularly that related to early warning of Soviet attack.
2. The Secretary of Defense shall be the Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of such communications means, necessary to provide the most timely transmission of critical intelligence to higher authorities. In the execution of this responsibility, he shall effect coordination with other Government agencies in order that their communications facilities may be utilized to the extent deemed practicable.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and support of the members of the United States Intelligence Board, shall provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the

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(Attachment a)

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communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the United States Intelligence Board, shall define critical intelligence and establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence.

- 2 -

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I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

IAC-D-125  
23 July 1958


MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF IAC AND USCIB

SUBJECT: Revision of NSCIDs

1. General Truscott has asked that the attached draft memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, transmitting the proposed revised NSCID 1 and NSCID 6 be forwarded to the IAC and USCIB members for review. The memorandum also transmits proposed change sheets for NSCIDs 2, 3, 4 and 5 (New Series) appropriate for conforming them to the proposed revisions in NSCIDs 1 and 6. Pursuant to suggestions of the Critical Communications Committee (in which both IAC and USCIB members participate) similar changes and the deletion of two sentences are recommended in the draft NSCID 7 on which the NSC has not yet acted.

2. The draft of NSCID 1 was approved at the joint 15 July meeting of the IAC and USCIB members, and certain revisions in draft NSCID 6 tentatively agreed following that meeting are being circulated separately for final concurrence. It is believed that the proposed changes in NSCIDs 2, 3, 4 and 5 and in proposed NSCID 7 do not require consideration at a formal IAC-USCIB meeting. Consequently, we would appreciate it if the IAC-USCIB agencies would clear (a) the proposed letter of transmittal and (b) the proposed revisions in NSCIDs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7, by telephone.

3. Please advise General Truscott's office (Code 143, extension 4701) of your concurrence or non-concurrence, no later than the close of business Monday, 28 July, as we desire to forward these documents to the NSC as soon as possible.



Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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Attachment

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DRAFT - O-DD/C  
23 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Recommendation No. 2, Report of the President's  
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence  
Activities, dated 24 October 1957

REFERENCE : NSC Action #1873 dated 13 March 1958

1. As directed in memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence dated 14 March 1958, subject as above, I have consulted with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and the United States Communications Intelligence Board as to the best means for carrying out NSC Action 1873, of 13 March 1958, directing establishment of a single U. S. Intelligence Board. With the concurrence of the members of the IAC and of USCIB, I am herewith forwarding proposals for revision of the present NSCID 1 (New Series) and of NSCID 9 (the latter to be renumbered NSCID 6 of the New Series) to accomplish the recommended action.

2. In the proposed revised NSCID 6 there has also been incorporated language to assign to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Agency responsibility for the conduct of ELINT activities, in accordance with USCIB-approved recommendations of a special USCIB Task Force for effecting such action, as recommended by the Baker Panel. This draft NSCID 6 would, therefore, replace both the present NSCID 9 and the present NSCID 17, dealing with COMINT and ELINT, respectively. You will note that distribution of NSCID 6 should be closely limited and that only a limited number of the drafts thereof have been attached.

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3. If the National Security Council approves these two revised directives, only minor additional changes will be necessary in NSCIDs 2, 3, 4 and 5 (of the New Series, effective 21 April 1958) as indicated in separate change sheets appended hereto.

4. In the case of the proposed new NSCID 7, Critical Intelligence Communications -- on which NSC action has been held in abeyance pending receipt from the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence of recommendations for its detailed implementation (due 15 August 1958) it is now recommended that the last two sentences of paragraph 1 be deleted from the 28 January 1958 draft NSCID previously submitted. In addition, the references to the "Intelligence Advisory Committee" in paragraphs 3 and 4 should be changed appropriately to read the "U. S. Intelligence Board".

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

Attachments:

- A. Revised NSCID 1 /to be attached to final document/
- B. Revised NSCID 6 /to be attached to final document on a limited basis/
- C. Change Sheet - NSCID 2
- D. Change Sheet - NSCID 3
- E. Change Sheet - NSCID 4
- F. Change Sheet - NSCID 5

S-E-C-R-E-T

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
NSCID 1, dated 15 July 1958 and  
NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 1, lines 1 and 2: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 7, line 5: Change "paragraph 5" to "paragraph 3.a."

Par. 7, lines 6 and 7: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

S-E-C-R-E-T.

(ATTACHMENT C)

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 3

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
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NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 1.e., line 3: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 4, line 3: Change "competency" to "exclusive competence"

Par. 4, line 7: Change "IAC" to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 5, lines 7 and 8: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 7.d., lines 2 and 3: Change "represented on the Intelligence  
Advisory Committee" to "represented on the U. S. Intelligence  
Board with responsibilities for the production of finished  
intelligence".

Par. 8, line 6: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

S-E-C-R-E-T

(ATTACHMENT D)



RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
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NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 2, line 4: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 5, line 3: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 12, lines 3 and 4: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
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Par. 12, line 4: Change "paragraph 5" to "paragraph 3.a."

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(ATTACHMENT E)

RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

(To conform it to proposed revisions of  
NSCID 1, dated 15 July 1958 and  
NSCID 6, dated )

Par. 2.a., lines 1 and 2: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee"  
to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 2.c., lines 2, 3 and 4: Change two references to "Intelligence  
Advisory Committee" to "U. S. Intelligence Board"

Par. 9, line 2: Change "Intelligence Advisory Committee" to  
"U. S. Intelligence Board"

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(ATTACHMENT F)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IAC-D-123/2  
25 August 1958

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE IAC AND USCIB

SUBJECT: NSCID No. 6 -- Recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence with Reference to Paragraph 3.

1. On the afternoon of 22 August, Dr. Killian and General Hull met with General Cabell and myself to present their views and recommendations with respect to NSCID No. 6 which is currently scheduled for NSC consideration on 28 August 1958.

2. Dr. Killian and General Hull expressed the view that paragraph 3. of the directive is improperly placed, too inflexible, and inconsistent with the authority of DIRNSA as set forth in paragraphs 8.a. and 8.c. It is my understanding that they intend to recommend to the NSC that a change along the following lines be made in the directive:

Modify the wording of present paragraph 3. and add it in amended form as a new paragraph 6.c. to paragraph 6. which deals with the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. The new paragraph, as I understand they would propose it, would be somewhat as follows:

"6.c. The responsibility to conduct those ELINT collection and processing activities which the Secretary of Defense determines (, with the advice of DIRNSA,?) are essential to provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations, will be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to those commanders, or to the cryptologic agencies which support them."

3. Dr. Killian and General Hull believe that the new wording indicated above will properly provide that any delegations of responsibility in the ELINT field will be made at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense as the executive agent of the Government for ELINT and, further, will clearly indicate the advisory role DIRNSA should have in such matters in the light of his responsibilities under the provisions of paragraphs 8.a. and 8.c.


4. Dr. Killian and General Hull also raised some questions about the wording of paragraph 9.4. of the draft NSCID No. 6. but did not suggest any specific amendment or modification. They may wish to discuss this at the NSC meeting.

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
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5. I suggest that we discuss this matter at the joint IAC-USCIB meeting on 26 August.

  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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